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THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL ADOPTION
OF COMPARATIVE FAULT IN SOUTH
CAROLINA
JERRY
I.

J. PHILLIPS*

INTRODUCTION

A review of the reasons why a comparative-fault doctrine
should be adopted in South Carolina has been ably done elsewhere. 1 The pressing issue in South Carolina is whether this
doctrine should be adopted judicially or legislatively. It is clear
that the judiciary, as well as the legislature, has the power to
adopt a comparative-fault rule. The real question is whether, as
a matter of policy, the courts should defer to the legislature in
this area. The thesis of this article is that the courts should take
the initiative in view of the complexity of the problems associated with such a change in the law. These problems call for the
kind of fine-tuning that is more a characteristic of judicial decision making than of legislative enactment.
Moreover, prior holdings of the South Carolina Supreme
Court mandate that some action be taken in this area. This
court has held that a comparative-fault doctrine that applies to
only one class of individuals is unconstitutional as violative of
* Professor of Law, University of Tennessee School of Law. A.B., Yale University,
1956; J.D., Yale Law College, 1961; M.A., Cambridge University, 1964.
This article is an outgrowth of a CLE speech the author delivered to the bench and
bar of South Carolina at Columbia in March of this year under the joint auspices of the
South Carolina Bar and University of South Carolina School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful suggestions of Professor David G. Owen of the University
of South Carolina School of Law.
1. See generally Symposium: Comparative Negligence in Louisiana, 40 LA. L. Rv.
289 (1980); Commentary, A Call for the Adoption of Comparative Negligence in South
Carolina, 31 S.C.L. REv. 757 (1980).
2. Several states have adopted judicially a comparative-fault doctrine. See, e.g.,
Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532
P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1974);
Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979); Bradley v.
Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979). See generally Comments on Maki
v. Frelk-Comparativev. ContributoryNegligence: Should the Court or LegislatureDecide? 21 VAm. L. REv. 889 (1968).
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equal protection of the law.3 Yet, South Carolina has some com-

parative-fault rules that apply to only a part of the field of torts
law. Under the South Carolina court's interpretation of equal
protection, these rules either should be struck down as unconstitutional or extended to the entire field of tort law. Since these
rules are longstanding and fundamental to tort law, their extension rather than expungement is the desirable alternative.
II. THE SCOPE OF THE DOCTRINE

A. Forms of the Doctrine
Numerous decisions must be made about the scope of the
comparative-fault doctrine. Among the most important is the
appropriate form to adopt, "partial" (or "modified") and "pure"
being the usual choices.4 Under a partial system, a plaintiff may
recover only as long as his fault is not as great as-or, some
courts say, not greater than-that of the defendant. The pure
system allows a plaintiff to recover against a defendant who is
proximately at fault to any degree. A minority of jurisdictions,
mostly by judicial decision, have adopted the pure form as the
most equitable. The majority, however, have adopted one of the
partial forms in the belief that it is unfair to allow a plaintiff to
recover when he is either equally at fault, or more at fault, than
the defendant.,
The partial form has some unfortunate attributes. For ex-

3. Marley v. Kirby, 271 S.C. 122, 245 S.E.2d 604 (1978). See text accompanying
notes 44-46 infra.
4. See Commentary, supra note 1, at 776-77.
In a recent article the proposition is persuasively advanced that, under a state constitutional "intermediate" (as opposed to either a "strict" or a "rational-basis") standard
of review, a "modified" comparative-fault system is unconstitutional under the equal
protection clause. See Sowle & Conkle, Comparative Negligence Versus the Constitutional Guarantyof Equal Protection: A Hypothetical JudicialDecision, 1979 DuKE L.J.
1083. The constitutional reasoning is the same as that of the South Carolina Supreme
Court in Marley v. Kirby, 271 S.C. 122, 245 S.E.2d 604 (1978), and indicates that South
Carolina is constitutionally required to adopt a "pure" rather than a "modified" form of
comparative fault. The article also presents a thorough and well-reasoned analysis of the
disadvantages of modified comparative fault and the superior features of a pure system
of comparison. See Sowle & Conkle, supra.
5. See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d

804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla.
1974); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979).
6. See, e.g., Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol32/iss2/3

2

Phillips: The Case for Judicial
Adoption of Comparative
Fault in South Caro
COMPARATIVE
1980]
FAULT

ample, while the doctrine of last clear chance is usually abolished under a system of comparative fault, it would presumably
become applicable again under the partial form once the plain7
tiff's fault equaled or was greater than that of the defendant.
This application could result in a plaintiff, barred from partial
recovery because of the degree of his fault, nevertheless recovering his entire damages by virtue of the last clear chance doctrine. This doctrine is widely recognized as unsound and merely
an intermediate step between the harsh common-law rule of
contributory negligence and the more equitable rule of compara-

tive fault.8
The better view is that under a partial system the jury
should be instructed on the effect of its verdict, i.e., that a finding of 50% fault-or 51% under some systems-of plaintiff will
bar his recovery entirely.9 The need for this practical instruction
indicates another deficiency of the partial system: the jury's opportunity to twist or bend its basic factual determinations in order to achieve the result it desires. It seems better to allow the
jury to reach its factual determination untrammeled by such
considerations. In addition, it is difficult to see why a single degree change in the middle range of fault should have the drastic
effect of barring recovery.
B. Areas of Application
Comparative fault reduces rather than precludes recovery
when plaintiff is contributorily negligent. Courts also usually apply the doctrine when plaintiff is charged with impliedly assum-

7. "Of course, when a state has modified comparative negligence a strong argument

could be made that last clear chance should still apply when negligence is not compared." V. SCHWARTZ, COmPARATirv NEGLIGENCE § 7.2, at 139 (1974). Last clear chance
may be retained as an exception to comparative fault,"but the trend is to abolish it as a
general exception. Id.
8. See James, Last Clear Chance: A TransitionalDoctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938).
The doctrine does, however, serve the useful purpose of mitigating the harshness of the
all-or-nothing rule in a contributory negligence jurisdiction.
9. Thomas v. Salem Township Bd. of Trustees, 224 Kan. 539, 548-52, 582 P.2d 271,
278-80 (1978).
The 51%-49% rule is preferable to a 50%-50% bar if the jury is not instructed on
the effect of its verdict, "because a 50-50 apportionment is a very comfortable one for
juries." W. PROSSER, J. WADE, & V. SCHWARTZ, TORTS CASES AND MATERIALS 610 (6th ed.
1976). The jury's intent to so apportion would be frustrated by a 50%-50% cutoff rule of
which it was unaware.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

3

SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW
[Vol.
South Carolina
Law Review,
Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2020], Art.
3

32

ing a known risk in a voluntary and unreasonable manner 0 and
when plaintiff is charged with foreseeable misuse of a product.11
There may be some areas when plaintiff's fault will not be used
to reduce recovery even under a comparative-fault rule. Traditionally, contributory negligence has been no defense to a charge
of willful misconduct 2 and the same rule may apply to comparative fault. 13 Similarly, contributory negligence (and perhaps
comparative fault) is inapplicable when defendant has violated a
statute enacted to protect the plaintiff against his own fault.1 4 If
plaintiff were injured because of the failure of defendant to provide a safety device whose purpose is to guard against the very
conduct of plaintiff that caused the injury, contributory negligence (and arguably comparative fault) may not be applied. 5
Similarly, contributory negligence (and perhaps comparative
fault) may not be applied to workplace injuries when plaintiff is
required to work near a dangerous condition created by
defendant.16
All of these no-contributory-fault rules should probably be
eliminated under comparative fault, however, since they are in
conflict with the basic policies underlying its adoption. The rules
probably originated in part to alleviate the harshness of the contributory negligence rule and, with the adoption of comparative
fault, this reason for the rules disappears. Also, leaving arguably
arbitrary exceptions to the basic doctrine of comparative fault
10. See, e.g., Sunday v. Stratton Corp., 136 Vt. 293, 390 A.2d 398 (1978).
11. See, e.g., Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42
(Alaska 1976); General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977). Hopkins
has been overruled with respect to its definition of an "unreasonably dangerous" product
in strict liability design defect cases. Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844,
847 (Tex. 1979). Hopkins still stands for the proposition that comparative fault applies
in products liability "foreseeable misuse" cases. See also Fischer, Products Liability-Applicability of Comparative Negligence to Misuse and Assumption of the Risk,
43 Mo. L. Rnv. 431 (1978).
12. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 65, at 426 (4th ed. 1971).
13. See generally Owen, The Highly Blameworthy Manufacturer:Implications on
Rules of Liability and Defense in Products Liability Actions, 10 IND. L. REV. 769 (1977).
14. See W. PRossaR, supra note 12, at 425-26.
15. Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Co., 60 N.J. 402, 412, 290 A.2d 281, 285 (1972). The defense of contributory negligence is especially weak when defendant has represented his

product to be safe and plaintiff relies, perhaps imprudently, on the representation. See
Twerski, The Use and Abuse of ComparativeNegligence in ProductsLiability, 10 IND.
L. Rav. 797, 802-04 (1977).
16. D. NoEL & J. PHULnI S, PRODUCTS LiAniLrry us A NUTSHELL 242-43 (1974)(charge
of assumption of the risk).
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may well conflict with the South Carolina Supreme Court's conceptual view of equal protection.1" There is, however, no reason
why the policy underlying these various rules may not be taken
into consideration as a relevant factor in assessing comparative
fault.
A growing number of jurisdictions have applied comparative-fault principles to strict products liability litigation."' Some
courts have been unwilling to do so because of the conceptual
difficulty of comparing fault with no-fault and because of a belief that the policies underlying strict liability militate against
considering plaintiff's misconduct as being relevant to liability."
The policy argument seems weak. Plaintiff's fault in the form of
assumption of the risk and unforeseeable misuse is treated as a
bar to recovery in strict liability. If some types of plaintiff misconduct are relevant to strict liability, it is difficult to see why
contributory negligence is not also relevant-particularly in view
of the fact that the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and misuse often overlap. 0
The doctrinal problem in comparing fault with no-fault is
more difficult. Some courts treat the issue as one of comparing
degrees of causation 2 rather than of fault, although the results
may be very different if a cause rather than fault comparison is
used 2 2 The Uniform Comparative Fault Act allows considera-

17. See Marley v. Kirby, 271 S.C. 122, 245 S.E.2d 604 (1978). See text accompanying notes 45-51 infra.
18. See Fischer, supra note 11, at 431; Case Comment, ComparativeNegligence and
Strict Products Liability, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 883 (1977). Some courts compare assumption

of the risk, but not contributory negligence, in strict products liability actions. See, e.g.,
Holdsclaw v. Warren & Brewster, - Or. App. -, 607 P.2d 1208 (1980).
19. See, e.g., Kinard v. The Coats Co., 37 Colo. App. 555, 557, 553 P.2d 835, 837
(1976); Seay v. Chrysler Corp., Wash. 2d -,
609 P.2d 1382 (1980). But see Comment, Comparative Contributionand Strict Tort Liability: A Proposed Reconciliation,

13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 889 (1980)(suggesting equal division of liability, between or among
at-fault and strictly liable cotortfeasors, as the most equitable system).
20. See D. NOEL & J. PHLLIPS, supra note 16, at 219-22.
21. See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, Beloit Power Syss., Inc., 610 F.2d 149 (3d
Cir. 1979). The California Supreme Court recently held that any manufacturer of a "substantial percentage" of the market of the drug DES could be held liable to an injured

plaintiff "for the proportion of the judgment represented by its share of that market
unless it demonstrates that it could not have made the product which caused plaintiff's
injuries." Sindel v. Abbott Laboratories, Cal. 3d .
. 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 145 (1980).
22. See Twerski, supra note 15, at 821-22.
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tion of both fault and causation in apportioning liability.2
Others have urged that marketing a defective product may be
viewed as blameworthy for purposes of fault comparison even
though the defective condition was latent and not reasonably
discoverable.24
South Carolina has a special problem in judicially adopting
comparative fault for strict tort liability since the General Assembly has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section
402A,2 5 including the comment that makes assumption of the
risk a complete defense and abolishes contributory negligence as
a defense.2" In order to integrate strict tort liability into comparative fault, certain portions of these enactments would have to
be repealed. Alternatively, they may be declared unconstitutional under the equal protection rationale discussed below.27 In
any event, there is no legislation to prevent the South Carolina
judiciary from applying comparative fault to all negligence actions and to strict liability actions based on breach of express or
implied warranties.28

23. UNIFORM CompmnvvE FAULT ACT

§ 2(b),

reprinted in 40 LA. L. REv. 403, 419

(1980).
24. See Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some
ProductLiability Concepts, 60 MInQ. L. REv. 297, 331 (1977); Wade, Products Liability
and Plaintiff's Fault-The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 29 MERCER L. Rev. 373,
377 (1978).
25. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (1976). See generally Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administrationof Strict Tort Liabilityfor Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REv. 803 (1976).
26. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-20 (codifying the last sentence of RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965)). The legislature has incorporated by
reference all comments to § 402A as the legislative intent. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-30
(1976).
27. See text accompanying notes 45-47 infra.
28. An action for breach of express or implied warranty is a form of strict liability.
D. NOEL & J. PHmLLIS, supra note 16, at 13. Privity of contract is not required in an
action for breach of express or implied warranty in South Carolina. JKT Co. v. Hardwick, S.C. ._, 265 S.E.2d 510 (1980); Gasque v. Eagle Mach. Co., 270 S.C. 499, 50203, 243 S.E.2d 831, 832 (1978).
The inspection language of U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b) and the proximate cause language
of U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) can be read as introducing to some extent a contributory negligence defense into warranty law. See also U.C.C. § 2-314, Comment 13; id. § 2-715, Comment 5. These Code sections may, however, be glossed to allow application of a comparative fault standard and the comments are not binding on the courts.
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C. Multiple Defendants
When there is more than one defendant, a number of
problems arise in applying comparative fault. Of fundamental
importance is the issue of whether the concept of joint and several liability should be retained. A number of jurisdictions retain
the concept,2 9 while a few provide for apportionment of liability
between or among defendants.3 Under the apportionment approach, if plaintiff were 20% at fault and each of two defendants
were 40% at fault, plaintiff could recover only 40% of his damages from any one of the defendants. Under traditional principles of joint and several liability, he could obtain a judgment for
80% of his damages against either or both defendants, although
he could only collect the 80% once-in whole from one defendant or in part from each.
Apportioning liability between or among defendants when
all parties are at fault seems more sensible than joint and several liability. There is no good reason why one at-fault defendant should be responsible for the fault of another solvent de-

fendant. Let the burden of seeking recovery from the other
defendant lie with the culpable plaintiff who invokes the court's
aid. If plaintiff is without fault, a culpable defendant should
probably bear the loss of another defendant who is unable to
pay. If plaintiff is not at fault and all defendants are solvent and
before the court, the question of whether or not to apportion
seems academic. If a solvent defendant is not before the court,
however, the innocent plaintiff probably should have a joint and
several judgment and the culpable defendant or defendants
should then have the burden of seeking contribution. An innocent plaintiff should not be penalized to the advantage of an atfault defendant.
When a claim cannot be collected against one of the defendants and plaintiff is partly at fault, the approach of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act is to apportion the uncollectible liability between the at-fault plaintiff and the other defendant or
defendants who can pay, on the basis of their relative degrees of

29. See Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska
1976); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978).
30. See Wilson v. Probst, 224 Kan. 459, 581 P.2d 380 (1978); Ohio River Pipeline
Corp. v. Landrum, 580 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1979)(permissive several liability).
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fault. Thus, if plaintiff A is 20% at fault and defendants B and
C are each 40% at fault, but C is unable to pay, A will bear twosixths of C's responsibility and B the remaining four-sixths. If A
is without fault, then B would bear the entire responsibility for
C's fault.81
A related problem arises when one defendant settles with
the plaintiff, who then sues a cotortfeasor. The cotortfeasor
should receive a credit against his liability at least equal to the
settlement amount. The approach of the Uniform Act is to grant
a credit equal to the full amount for which the settlor would
have been liable had the plaintiff taken judgment against him.3 2
This approach will tend to discourage settlements, but its virtue
is that the remaining defendant is not prejudiced by the conduct
of others over whom he has no control. It may be necessary to
retain the settlor as a party in the litigation between plaintiff
and the nonsettling defendant in order to get a fair determination of the degrees of fault.
A final major issue is how to determine relative degrees of
fault when a partial comparative-fault rule is applied. Specifically, should plaintiff's fault be compared with all defendants together or with each defendant separately for purposes of determining the apportionment cutoff point? Plaintiff may be able to
recover under the former approach even though he could not
under the latter. For example, suppose plaintiff A is 30% at
fault, defendant B is 50% at fault, and defendant C is 20% at
fault. In a partial comparative-fault jurisdiction, A would be un-

31. See UNIFORM CoMPAATIvE FAULT AcT § 2(d). This Act thus partially dispenses
with joint liability when plaintiff is at fault and his claim against another defendant is
uncollectable. The author's proposal would go further and place the onus on the culpable
plaintiff, rather than on the culpable defendant, to seek contribution from another defendant; if this contribution is not available, that liability should then be shared among
the remaining parties at fault as described in the Uniform Act. On the other hand, the
burden of establishing the proper apportionment of damages should be placed on the
defendants. See text accompanying notes 84-86 infra. If this burden is not carried, either
liability would remain joint and several or the factfinder would be permitted to make a
rough apportionment. See Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products Liability Statutes of Limitations, 56 N.C.L. Rav. 663, 667-68 (1978).
32. UNIFORM ComPiAa Trr FAULT Acr § 6. The two possibilities discussed in the text
contemplate releasing the settlor from liability for contribution. A third possibility is to
allow the nonsettling tortfeasor to seek contribution against the settlor. This was the
solution of the 1939 UNIFORM CONMrRMUION AcT and it has a substantial deterrent effect
on settlements. The three methods of treating settlements are discussed in the comment
to § 6 of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol32/iss2/3

8

Phillips: The Case for Judicial
Adoption of Comparative
Fault in South Caro
COMPARATIVE
FAULT
1980]

able to recover anything against C if A's fault is compared solely
with C's, since A's fault is greater than that of C. If the fault of
B and C are combined for purposes of comparison, A can recover
against both B and C (either jointly and severally or 50% and
33
20% of the damages respectively), since 30% is less than 70% .
The better rule seems to be to combine the defendants'
fault for purposes of comparison. To do otherwise may result in
a culpable defendant not being liable to plaintiff at all. Moreover, in the event of such nonliability, thorny questions arise
concerning how that liability should be allocated between or
among plaintiff and the remaining defendant or defendants. If a
remaining defendant bears any portion of that liability, further
complications arise regarding possible claims for contribution by
that defendant against the defendant who is not liable to plaintiff."' There is also the undesirable possibility that in the contribution action the degrees of fault would be determined in differing proportions than they were in the original suit.
Combining the defendants' fault for purposes of comparison
in a partial comparative-fault system normally will avoid the
problems discussed in the preceding paragraph, since either all

guilty defendants in a single suit should be liable or none should
be.35 This combining of fault argues for a pure rather than a partial comparative negligence approach, since the combination
may result in a plaintiff recovering against a defendant who is
less at fault than plaintiff. Under a pure comparative-fault ap-

33. Compare Graci v. Damon, - Mass. , 383 N.E.2d 842 (1978)(plaintiff's fault
measured against all defendants' combined liability) with Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco,
161 N.J. Super. 301, 391 A.2d 928 (1978)(plaintiff's fault measured against that of each
defendant).
34. That one tortfeasor is immune from liability to plaintiff does not mean that he
is immune from a claim for contribution by a cotortfeasor. The authorities are divided.
Compare Chamberlain v. McCleary, 217 F. Supp. 591 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) (no contribution) with Nolechek v. Gesaule, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340
(1978)(contribution allowed).
35. If several suits are involved, however, there may be conflicting results as to percentages of fault. As Dean Wade observes, "[b]oth plaintiffs and defendants have sufficient incentives to join other negligent persons, since this will have the effect of reducing
their percentages of responsibility." Wade, Comparative Negligence-Its Development
in the United States and its Present Status in Louisiana, 40 LA. L. REv. 299, 311
(1980). Not all parties may be suable in a single jurisdiction, however, if they lack minimal contacts with that jurisdiction. After World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
100 S. Ct. 559 (1980), the mere occurrence of a tort within a jurisdiction is not a sufficient basis for asserting long-arm jurisdiction over a tortfeasor.
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proach, it makes no difference whether the defendants' degrees
of fault are combined or not for purposes of relative comparison,
since plaintiff's relative degree of fault will not bar recovery as
long as any defendant is also at fault in any degree.
D. Setoff
A limited but important problem exists for jurisdictions
that adopt either a pure comparative-fault rule or one that allows partial recovery as long as plaintiff's fault is not greater
than that of defendant. The problem is whether or not setoff
should be allowed when both parties have a claim against each
other."0 Suppose, for example, under a "not-greater-than" rule,
that A and B are both injured in an accident in which each is
equally at fault and that each suffers $10,000 damages. Shall
each be required to pay the other $10,000 or shall the claims be
set off against each other with no actual payment at all?
If either A or B is insured, the insurer benefits from a setoff to the detriment of the insured or the claimant, probably
contrary to the expectations of the insured. If the attorney for A
or B is hired on a contingency fee basis, he or she may also suffer by setoff through diminution of the res out of which his or
her fee is to be paid. Both of these considerations militate
against the use of setoff.
Other considerations arise if one of the claimants is judgment-proof. Suppose A is insured and has a claim for $10,000
against B, who is judgment-proof and has a claim for $15,000
against A. It would seem equitable that A's claim be satisfied
out of his own insurance before any payment is made to B. Suppose the same facts, except that A is solvent but uninsured. In
this situation, equitable considerations favor allowing A to set
off B's liability against A's own liability.3 7 These dispositions
36. A claim for set-off can arise only in a pure comparative-fault jurisdiction or in a
not-greater-than.partial-fault jurisdiction where each party's fault is the same. In all
other situations, one party's fault will be greater than that of the other and he, therefore,
will be barred from any recovery.
Some jurisdictions allow setoff. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 19.3. The Rhode
Island comparative-fault statute expressly prohibits setoff. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4.1
(Cum. Supp. 1979).
37. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act provides:
A claim and counterclaim shall not be set off against each other, except by
agreement of both parties. On motion, however, the court, if it finds that the
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avoid conferring a windfall on less worthy parties who are uninsured or insolvent.
E. Contribution
While adoption of comparative fault does not compel adoption of a rule of contribution among cotortfeasors, 5 logic and
sound policy suggest that both be adopted. When fault is divided between cotortfeasors on a degree-of-fault basis,39 no
tortfeasor is immune from contribution because his or her fault
is less than that of the other; by analogy, a pure comparative
fault standard should be used in determining a plaintiff's claim
against a defendant. Adoption of this kind of comparative contribution rule may be particularly necessary in South Carolina
as a result of the state's crashworthiness doctrine discussed
40
below.
When joint and several liability is not retained with comparative fault, the need for contribution is eliminated, at least
when all parties are joined in a single suit. In that situation, a
defendant would never be required to pay more than his equitaobligation of either party is likely to be uncollectible, may order that both parties make payment into court for distribution. The court shall distribute the
funds received and declare obligations discharged as if the payment into court
by either party had been a payment to the other party and any distribution of
those funds back to the party making payment had been a payment by him to
the other party.
UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT AcT § 3.
38. The Washington Supreme Court refused to adopt contribution merely because
the state had a rule of comparative fault. Wenatchee Wenoka Growers Ass'n v. Krack
Corp., 89 Wash. 2d 847, 576 P.2d 288 (1978). The Connecticut Supreme Court found that
the legislature's adoption of comparative fault did not evidence a legislative intent to
abolish that state's no-contribution rule. Gomeau v. Forrest, 176 Conn. 523, 409 A.2d
1006 (1979).
South Carolina presently does not allow a claim for contribution. Adcox v. American
Home Assur. Co., 258 S.C. 331, 188 S.E.2d 785 (1972).
39. While some jurisdictions allow contribution on an equal basis, see, e.g., TENN.
CODE ANN. § 23-3102(b) (Supp. 1979), others divide liability based on degree of fault. See
Phillips, Contributionand Indemnity in Products Liability,42 TSNN. L. REV. 85 (1974).
The latter approach is the one adopted by the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, §§ 2, 4.
Some jurisdictions allow complete recovery by a "passively" negligent tortfeasor
against a cotortfeasor who is "actively" negligent, although this rule has been severely
criticized and rejected by other jurisdictions. See Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Whitehead &
Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. 1978). The actively negligent tortfeasor under this rule,
like the more-at-fault plaintiff in a partial comparative-fault jurisdiction, would be
barred from seeking contribution.
40. See text accompanying notes 80-82 infra.
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ble share. If all matters are not litigated in a single lawsuit, difficult problems of loss apportionment arise. The litigant's self-interest normally should be a strong incentive to join all likely
41
parties whenever possible.

F. Recapitulation
Thus, there are a number of difficult problems and policy
choices connected with the adoption of comparative fault and
the previous discussion highlights rather than exhausts the list
of such considerations.42 It seems eminently appropriate for the
South Carolina Supreme Court to adopt comparative fault, instead of treating the subject solely as a matter for the legislature. The nature of the problems and policies to be considered

are more suitable to judicial analysis than to a legislative resolution made in response to political concerns and special-interest
group pressures. Even if a comparative-fault statute were
adopted, it is likely that many major issues would be left open
for resolution by the courts.43 If the judiciary is suited to resolve
some of these issues, it is suited to resolve them all. There
should be little question of legislative opposition to comparative
fault, since the General Assembly has already shown its approval
of the doctrine in principle by passing comparative-fault statutes of limited application. 44 Moreover, as indicated in the following section, South Carolina may be required under its interpretation of constitutional law either to extend comparative
fault throughout the law of torts, or to strike down those limited
comparative-fault doctrines that already exist in the state.
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF APPLYING

COMPARATIVE FAULT ON A LIMITED BASIS

A.

Equal Protection Under State Law

In 1974, the South Carolina General Assembly passed a
41. See note 35 supra.

42. For a more extensive catalog of the issues involved, see generally V. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 7; Wade, supra note 35.
43. For example, South Carolina's automobile comparative-fault statute seems to
address only the issue of partial comparative fault vis-&-vis a single plaintiff and a single
defendant. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-300 (1976).
44. These comparative-fault statutes are the railroad employee statutes, S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 658-17-3730, -3740 (1976) and the automobile statute, id. § 15-1-300.
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statute providing for the application of comparative fault to automobile accident litigation.4 5 The supreme court, in Marley v.
Kirby,4 struck down this statute under the equal protection
clauses of the state and federal constitutions. While recognizing
"the validity of comparative negligence statutes of general application," the court saw "no rational basis for separating injuries
' '4
from motor vehicle accidents from injuries from other tort& 7
In reaching this result, the Marley court relied upon its earlier
decision of Broome v. Truluck,48 which struck down as unconstitutional a special tort statute of repose, or outer-cutoff statute of
limitations, for architects, engineers, and contractors. There, the
court stated as the rationale for its holding: " '[A]rchitects, engineers, and contractors are not the only persons whose negligence
in the improvement of real property may cause damage or injury
to others.' -49
In all probability these decisions are not compelled by fed-

eral constitutional law. 50 They are, however, based on state constitutional standards and nothing in federal law prohibits states
from imposing a stricter standard of equal protection than that
required by the federal constitution.5 1 The decisions represent a
clear statement of a quite restrictive constitutional review of
state statutes on equal protection grounds and, therefore, directly apply to any comparative-fault rules presently in effect in
South Carolina.
The Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §53 (1976),

45. 1974 S.C. Acts 2718, No. 1177 (presently codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-300
(1976)) provided:
In any motor vehicle accident, contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in any action by any person or legal representative to recover damages for
negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such contributory negligence was equal to or less than the negligence which must be established in order to recover from the party against whom recovery is sought.
46. 271 S.C. 122, 245 S.E.2d 604 (1978).
47. Id. at 124-25, 245 S.E.2d at 606.
48. 270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978).
49. 271 S.C. at 125, 245 S.E.2d at 606 (quoting 270 S.C. at 230-31, 241 S.E.2d at

740).
50. See Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929)(upholding guest statute against consti-

tutional attack). "Contrary to the position of those courts which hold that the repose
statutes for architects and builders are based on irrational classifications, a legislature
would seem entitled to make such a judgment." 5 Research Group, Inc., Final Report of
the Legal Study 10-11 (1977)(prepared for Interagency Task Force. on Product Liability).
51. See Sowle & Conkle, supra note 4, at 1102.
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establishes a pure comparative-fault rule for tort claims brought
under that Act. That statute cannot be invalidated on state constitutional grounds because of the federal supremacy clause, Article VI of the United States Constitution, and the statute is in
all probability constitutional under the relatively lax standards
of federal constitutional review. Thus, the FELA comparativefault rule must be applied in South Carolina, and accordingly
that rule must be extended to all areas of tort law in this state in
order to comply with the constitutional mandate of Broome and
Truluck.
It is possible that the state supreme court would not consider the Broome-Truluck doctrine binding in a situation where
the application of that doctrine is triggered by a mandatory federal, as opposed to a state, standard. Avoidance of the state doctrine, however, because of its relation to federal law would seem
unduly insular and not logically defensible.
There are other areas of tort law in South Carolina, discussed hereafter, where in reality a comparative-fault rule is now
being applied as a matter of state law. In these areas, the supreme court of the state has a choice. It can either strike down
the application of a comparative-fault rule in such limited areas,
or else it can extend that rule to the entire field of tort law, to
comply with the constitutional demands of Broome and
Truluck.
B.

The Present Status of Comparative Fault in South
Carolina

1. The Railroad Statute.-The South Carolina Code provides that contributory negligence and assumption of the risk
are not defenses in a suit by railroad employees against a railroad for injuries which result from a statutory violation; in all
other such suits not alleging statutory violation, recovery is apportioned according to the degree of fault of the employee.5 2
52. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-17-3730 (1976), which provides:

In all actions hereafter brought against any such common carrier by railroad under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this article to recover damages for personal injuries to any employee or when such injuries have resulted
in his death, the fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory
negligence shall not bar recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the
jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee.
But no such employee who may be injured or killed shall be held to have been
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This is a pure comparative-fault statute, limited to suits by railroad employees against their employers. It would seem inevitable that the statute be struck down if challenged on the authority of the Marley and Broome decisions.
2. The Avoidable Consequences Doctrine.-Professor
Dobbs states the avoidable consequences doctrine in its traditional form:
The plaintiff who is injured by actionable conduct of the
defendant, is ordinarily denied recovery for any item of special
damages he could have avoided by reasonable acts, including
reasonable expenditures, after the actionable conduct takes
place ....
The affirmative side of the rule is that the plaintiff is entitled to recover for expenditures reasonably made in an effort to
avoid or minimize damages caused by the defendant's conduct.
The avoidable consequences rule in its negative form is
not the same as the contributory negligence defense. For one
thing, the contributory negligence defense looks to the plaintiff's pre-tort conduct, while the avoidable consequences defense looks to his post-tort conduct."
Other differences between contributory negligence and avoidable
consequences suggested by Professor Dobbs are: (1) the former
applies only to negligence actions, while the latter applies to
contract cases as well; (2) there is no duty of reasonable care to
avoid damages if defendant's conduct is reckless or intentional;
(3) avoidable consequences, like comparative fault, merely
reduces damages, while contributory negligence bars recovery
entirely; and (4) the contributory negligence standard "may be
an objective one," while the "avoidable consequences rule probably takes the individual problems of the plaintiff into account
somewhat more readily, though it is hard to be very sure about
this.9"

Most, if not all, of these asserted differences between the
contributory negligence and avoidable consequences doctrines
guilty of contributory negligence when the violation by such common carrier of
any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or
death of such employee.
53. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF REMEDIES § 3.7, at 186-87 (1973).
54. Id. at 187-88.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

15

South Carolina
Law LAw
Review,
Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2020], Art.
3
SOUTH
CAROLINA
REVIEW
[Vol.

32

disappear on closer analysis. Contributory negligence has been
held in some jurisdictions to bar warranty claims that are contractual in nature. 5 The defense of contributory negligence is no
bar if defendant's conduct is reckless or willful. 56 To state that
unreasonable failure to avoid consequences reduces recovery,
while contributory negligence bars recovery entirely, is only to
assert a legal conclusion about the differences between the two
doctrines without offering any reason why that difference should
exist. There is no basis for concluding that one doctrine is any
more or any less objective or subjective in its application than
the other. 7
The "affirmative side," as labeled by Professor Dobbs,. of
the avoidable-consequences rule has its counterpart in the contributory-negligence doctrine. If a claimant is injured in a reasonable attempt to avoid the occurrence of defendant's tort, he
may recover for those injuries5 8 Rarely does the claimant incur
out-of-pocket expenses to avoid a tort, but if he did so reasonably, these expenses should be recoverable. If A paid B a reasonable sum of money to induce B to help A out of the path of C's
tortiously approaching instrumentality, A should be able to re-

cover this sum from C.
The one remaining difference between contributory negligence and unreasonable failure to avoid consequences is that of
the timing of the claimant's conduct. As Professor Dobbs says,
contributory negligence occurs prior to defendant's commission
of the tort, while unreasonable failure to avoid consequences occurs after commission of the tort. This temporal distinction is
often cited as the primary reason for the difference between the

55. See Noel, Defective Products:Abnormal Use, ContributoryNegligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. Rv. 93, 111-14 (1972).
56. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12.
57. In explanation of the supposed subjective standard for determining avoidable
consequences, Professor Dobbs notes that "some courts have recognized that the bank
balance of the individual plaintiff should govern on the question what expenditures
might reasonably be expected of him in minimizing his damages." D. DOBBS, supra note
53, at 188. This distinction seems no different from the general negligence rule which
"must make proper allowance for the risk apparent to the actor, for his capacity to meet
it, and for the circumstances under which he must act." W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 32,
at 150.
58. See, e.g., Rossman v. La Grega, 28 N.Y.2d 300, 270 N.E.2d 313, 321 N.Y.S.2d
588 (1971).
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two doctrines.59 Yet, the following close examination of the
cases, including those in South Carolina, shows that the purported distinction is not, and cannot, always be maintained.
Moreover, even if the distinction could be drawn clearly in all
cases, it nevertheless seems to be one without a difference.
Under any analysis, contributory negligence and avoidable consequences cannot be distinguished in logic or in policy. The result is that one part of contributory negligence (avoidable consequences) is being compared with defendant's negligence, while
the remaining portion of contributory negligence is not being
compared, even though there is no rational basis under Marley
and Broome*for drawing this distinction. The constitutional requirement of rational classification applies to court decisions as

well as to statutes.6 0 Thus, either the avoidable consequences
doctrine under the constitutional compulsion of these decisions
must be expunged from the law of South Carolina-a result
neither likely nor desirable-or sound reason and policy demand
that the doctrine be extended to establish a comprehensive doctrine of comparative fault in the state.
The traditional distinction between the two doctrines is
stated in Seay v. Southern Railway-Carolina Division61 and
Sullivan v. City of Anderson 2 In Seay, the court described contributory negligence as follows:
"'[W]hen the carelessness of the person inflicting the injury is
antecedent to the negligence of the person injured, and the latter might, by ordinary care, have discovered the failure of the
former to use such care in time to avoid the injury, there can
be no recovery, because the intervening negligence of the injured person is the direct and proximate cause of the
inj u ry.' ,,s s
In Sullivan, the court stated the traditional avoidable consequences rule: "The rule is well established that it is the duty of

59. See W.

PROSSER,

supra note 12, at 423.

60. The equal protection clause of the federal constitution applies to judicial decisions as well as to legislative enactments, since both constitute state action. Virginia v.
Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880).
61. 205 S.C. 162, 31 S.E.2d 133 (1944).
62. 81 S.C. 478, 62 S.E. 862 (1908).

63. 205 S.C. at 174, 31 S.E.2d at 138 (quoting Bodie v. Charleston & W.C. Ry., 61
S.C. 468, 486, 39 S.E. 715, 721 (1901)) (quoting 7 ENCY. LAw 383-85 (2d ed.)).
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the owner of property, injured by the negligence of another, to
use all reasonable effort to minimize the damage."" As the following examination indicates, however, the distinction is not
maintained in the cases, primarily because of the confusion created by continuing torts.
An early telegraph case illustrates the problem. In Willis v.
Western Union Telegraph Co.,", plaintiff claimed damages for
mental distress suffered as the result of the alleged negligent delay of defendant in transmitting a reply to plaintiff's inquiry regarding his mother's health. Damages were recoverable from the
time when plaintiff should have received the telegram to the
time when he received positive information regarding his
mother's health. The delay was obviously a continuing tortious
failure of defendant to act, not a completed act. Yet the court
held that "the jury might consider in mitigation of damages the
failure of plaintiff to use other means of communication within
his reach during that period of time."6 6 The mitigation of damages or avoidable consequences rule should have been applied
however, only if the tortious act had been completed.
The clearest case of ongoing tort is the repeated or continuing nuisance. In these situations a duty reasonably to avoid consequences has been imposed, even though the tort has not been
7
completed.
A bizarre train case illustrates the court's uncertainty in distinguishing avoidable consequences from contributory negligence. In Currie v. Davis,6 8 plaintiff bought a train ticket, but
was forcefully prevented from entering the train by the railroad's gatekeeper. Repeated attempts to enter resulted in repeated gatekeeper rejections accompanied by abusive language.
Plaintiff left the gate to complain to the ticket agent, who suggested that plaintiff try to enter the train by a nonpassenger entrance. Plaintiff then returned to the passenger gate and was
again forcefully and abusively rejected by the gatekeeper. No explanation is given in the opinion for the gatekeeper's actions or
for the ticket agent's failure to intervene. Plaintiff claimed dam-

64. 81 S.C. at 480, 62 S.E. at 863.
65.
66.
67.
68.

69 S.C. 531, 48 S.E. 538 (1904).
Id. at 539, 48 S.E. at 541.
See Fewell v. Catawba Power Co., 102 S.C. 452, 86 S.E. 947 (1915).
130 S.C. 408, 126 S.E. 119 (1923), appeal dismissed, 266 U.S. 182 (1924).
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ages for loss of business from the four-day delay in reaching his
destination and for mental anguish. A judgment for plaintiff was
upheld on appeal. Defendant railroad contended on appeal that
under the facts of this case the law imposed upon the plaintiff
the duty to minimize his damages, in so far as they were due to
humiliation resulting from the gatekeeper's first rejection, by
not thereafter subjecting himself to affront by repeatedly approaching the Cerberus at the gate, or by accepting the ticket
agent's kindly suggestion that he try a flanking movement. We
think the law applicable in that aspect of the case was the rule
of contributory negligence or willfulness rather than the principle as to mitigation or reduction of damages. But, if the latter
principle were applicable, the avoidable consequential damages
which the defendant was entitled to have eliminated from the
consideration of the jury were only such as could have been
avoided by the injured party in the exercise of proper care. 9
The temporal distinction between contributory negligence
and unreasonable failure to avoid consequences is so ephemeral
and unjustified that the courts occasionally have rejected it. In
70
Lipman v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad,
for example, plaintiff
sued defendant for mental anguish caused by the abusive language of defendant's conductor. Defendant's defense was that
the conductor's actions were provoked by plaintiff's wrongful
conduct in tendering cash instead of a ticket-conduct clearly
preceding defendant's actions and, therefore, traditionally described as contributory negligence. The court stated: "If that be
true [defendant's claim of provocation], it is a matter of defense,
and in mitigation of damages, even
if [plaintiff's] technical
71
rights as a passenger were violated.

In Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc.,72 fire damage to plaintiff's premises allegedly resulted from defendant-product supplier's failure
to provide an adequate warning. The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit stated that the "contributory negligence of

69. 130 S.C. at 422, 126 S.E. at 124.
70. 108 S.C. 151, 93 S.E. 714 (1917).
71. Id. at 154, 93 S.E. at 715.
If defendant's misconduct were willful and plaintiff's merely negligent, plaintiff's

misconduct should be irrelevant whether it be deemed contributory negligence or unreasonable failure to mitigate damages. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
72. 448 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1971)(applying South Carolina law).
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'
[plaintiff's] employees . . . in failing to respond promptly"
when they discovered the fire might be a defense if, on remand,
the trial court found that "contributory negligence is a defense
in a suit for breach of implied warranty. . . . The employees'
conduct here, characterized as "contributory negligence," clearly
followed defendant's commission of the tort.
In Spier v. Barker,75 the New York Court of Appeals recognized that plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt is conduct that
precedes an automobile accident and that "[tlraditionally" the
doctrine of avoidable consequences has been applied "only to
postaccident conduct. '76 The court nevertheless chose to treat
plaintiff's failure to wear her seat belt as an unreasonable failure
to avoid consequences, appaently in order to avoid the harsh
consequences of the all-or-nothing contributory negligence
rule.7
Dean Prosser candidly admits that "the doctrines of contributory negligence and avoidable consequences are in reality
the same. . . . ,78The Uniform Comparative Fault Act includes
within the definition of comparative fault the failure to avoid or
mitigate damages.
Thus, both case law and commentators make clear that the
doctrines of contributory negligence and unreasonable failure to
avoid consequences cannot be distinguished effectively. South
Carolina, therefore, already has a limited rule of comparative
fault in its avoidable consequences doctrine, which is not rationally distinguishable from contributory negligence. The only
question is whether the courts will acknowledge this fact and
take appropriate steps to extend the avoidable consequences
principle of comparative fault and to eliminate the defense of

73. Id. at 245.
74. Id. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
75. 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974).
76. Id. at 451, 323 N.E.2d at 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 921.
77. In Jones v. Dague, the court rejected "the view that the mere failure to use a
seat belt constitutes negligence or a failure to minimize damages" because defendant
failed to prove what portion of plaintiff's injuries were due to her failure to use a seat
belt. 252 S.C. 261, 271, 166 S.E.2d 99, 103-04 (1969). See TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-930
(1980), which provides: "[I]n no event shall failure to wear seat belts be considered as
contributory negligence, nor shall such failure to wear said seat belt be considered in
mitigation of damages on the trial of any civil action."
78. W. PROSSEi, supra note 12, at 424.
79. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT AcT §

1(b).
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contributory negligence. The alternative is to bar recovery entirely for unreasonable failure to avoid consequences so as to
conform this principle to the present rule of contributory negligence in South Carolina for equal protection purposes. This alternative would be unfair to a plaintiff who unreasonably fails to
avoid consequences and it demonstrates the basic unfairness of
the contributory negligence rule.
3. Crashworthiness.-The South Carolina Supreme Court,
in Mickle v. Blackmon,"° apportioned a judgment between
cotortfeasors, a construction company and an automobile manufacturer, for injuries plaintiff received when she was impaled on
an allegedly defectively designed stick shift lever. The accident
was caused by the construction company's negligent removal of
road signs and the injuries were aggravated by Ford's defective
design.
Cases of this type are often described as second-collision or
crashworthiness cases.8 1 The distinguishing feature is considered
to be that the conduct of one of the defendants does not cause

the accident, but only increases the injuries. This distinction is
not maintained consistently in the cases, however. For example,
if plaintiff is negligently injured by the operator of a lawn mower
and the injury could have been prevented had the manufacturer
of the mower installed an inexpensive safety guard or shield, the
operator and manufacturer are both generally held to be the
cause of the entire injury. But for the negligent operation of the
mower, the injury would never have happened. Yet, had the
mower been "crashworthy" (had it been equipped with an adequate guard), the injury likewise would not have occurred. Nevertheless, in Harrison v. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc.,82
this factual situation was treated as a crashworthiness case.
That the injuries caused by each defendant often occur at
slightly different times, rather than simultaneously, seems to be
immaterial. The use of this temporal difference for the purpose
of differentiating these cases from other cotortfeasor cases in

80. 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969).
81. See D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 417-45
(1976).

82. 381 F. Supp. 926 (S.D. Fla. 1974). Compare id. with the theoretically comparable case of Carpini v. Pittsburgh and Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954)(defendants apparently were held jointly and severally liable).
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which joint and several liability is imposed, resembles the use of
the artificial distinction traditionally employed to distinguish
contributory negligence from avoidable consequences. 3
In the Mickle situation, the construction company usually
should be liable for the entire damages if the aggravating conduct is reasonably foreseeable.84 Some courts place the burden of
making any required apportionment on the plaintiff.5 The better rule is to place this burden on the defendant, as is done with
contributory negligence, avoidable consequences, and comparative fault."6
The Mickle apportionment rule embodies a doctrine of
comparative contribution between or among cotortfeasors with
no joint and several liability to the plaintiff. If the rule cannot
be logically restricted to successive, as opposed to concurrent,
injuries-as it cannot be-the same compulsion that dictates extension of the avoidable consequences damages reduction approach to include contributory negligence also dictates extension
of the crashworthiness damages reduction approach to establish
a broad principle of comparative contribution in South Carolina.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Justice Holmes once said that "[t]he life of the law has not
been logic. It has been experience. '18 7 There is, however, no nec-

essary conflict between logic and experience. Indeed, the one
should lend support to the other. The essence of good judicial
decision-making is reasoned analysis and when such analysis
commands a particular course courts should not hesitate to
proceed.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has imposed a heavy

83. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 423-24 (aggravation of damages by plaintiff);
Phillips, In Tribute: Arno Cumming Becht, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 661, 664-65 (aggravation
of damages by defendant).
84. Thus, when a treating doctor foreseeably aggravates injuries caused by a
2d 84,
tortfeasor, the latter is liable for all damages. See, e.g., Gertz v. Campbell, 55 Ill.
302 N.E.2d 40 (1973).
85. E.g., Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).
86. See Zimmerman v. Ausland, 266 Or. 427, 513 P.2d 1167 (1973)(avoidable consequences); Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978)(crashworthiness); W.
PROSSER, supra note 12, at 416 (contributory negligence); V. SCHWARTZ,supra note 7, §
17.2 (comparative fault).
87. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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duty on the state's lawmaking bodies, both legislative and judicial, to justify their actions on especially strict constitutional
principles of rational classification and equal protection. That
duty fairly demands that the court deal with its avoidable consequences and crashworthiness doctrines either by their elimination or by their logical extension to the full-blown doctrines of
comparative fault and comparative contribution. Moreover, the
federally required application in South Carolina of a pure comparative-fault rule under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
mandates the extension of that rule to all areas of tort law in
this state, in order to comply with the state constitutional requirements of rational classification and equal protection.
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